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In contrast to the rest of India, where it is the govern-ment that predominantly owns and manages ports,the Indian state of Gujarat has implemented various
forms of port liberalization since the 1990s. This has helped
it become the country’s fastest growing state. Gujarat’s
economy has grown at an average of 10.14 percent per year
from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006, the last five years
for which data are available. This is comparable with
China’s average growth rate since 1978, and is distinctly
faster than the growth of the other Asian tigers in the 15
years before the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Gujarat has broken new ground with different forms of
privatization, ranging from private provision of port ser-
vices to completely private ownership of new ports. The
process started in the 1980s and gathered momentum
rapidly after the central government in New Delhi enacted
major economic reforms in the early 1990s. Gujarat has
taken advantage of a constitutional loophole to convert its
minor ports into some of the biggest ports in the country,
vastly improved the availability and efficiency of port infra-
structure, and facilitated the development of industrial
centers that otherwise would not have existed.
Gujarat’s port liberalization, alongwith its status as one of
the economically freest states in India, should serve as amod-
el for the rest of India and other developing countries, which
can also benefit from the dynamic gains of port privatization.
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Introduction
Until the1990s, Indianpolicymakers swore
by self-reliance and public sector dominance.
All major ports were owned and operated by
the government. India’s share of world trade
fell from 2.2 percent at independence in 1947
to 0.4 percent in the mid-1980s.1 This was
regarded as an achievement, not a tragedy, by
socialist planners at the time. Not surprising-
ly, these planners failed to pay enough atten-
tion to developing ports: after all, self-suffi-
ciency should, logically, lead to theabolitionof
all ports. So, India’s ports in the1980s suffered
from obsolete technology, low loading rates,
chronic congestion and delays, and poor con-
nectivity with the hinterland.2
However, one state, Gujarat, decided to go
in theoppositedirectionandreapedenormous
economic success as a result. In the early 1980s,
the state decided to harness ports and interna-
tional trade as vehicles for economic develop-
ment. It created theGujaratMaritimeBoard in
1982 toupgrade andexpand its ports.Over the
next two decades, the GMB planned the inte-
grateddevelopment of several newports, along
with the required road and rail links. It experi-
mented with several forms of privatization,
from privatizing port services to facilitating
private jetties, and from joint venture ports to
completelyprivateports.Thestate’sPortPolicy
Statement of December 1995 spelled out an
explicit strategy of port-led development,
including the creation of 10 completely new,
world-class ports, in which private-sector par-
ticipation would play a large role.
The initial tentative steps in the 1980s did
not yield dramatic results. India’s industrial
licensing policy at the time empowered the
central government to decide on the location
of all industries, and so industrialists couldnot
move to business-friendly states of their choice
(like Gujarat) even if they wanted to. However,
India’s economic reforms in 1991 virtually
abolished industrial licensing andmade it pos-
sible for individual states to attract industry
through competitive policies and institutions.
Gujarat’s port policies, which emphasized a
lead role for the private sector, greatly magni-
fied its ability to seize the new opportunities
created by economic liberalization. The happy
outcome was that Gujarat became the fastest
growing state in India (excluding minor states
likeDelhi andGoa). This carries a lesson for all
Indian maritime states and for other develop-
ing countries, too.
As Table 1 shows, Gujarat topped the
growth rate of major states, averaging 10.14
percent per year in state gross domestic prod-
uct in 2000–06.3 An earlier study by economist
Montek Ahluwalia also showed Gujarat on
top in 1991–99, with growth averaging 8.15
percent per year.4
Yet Gujarat was not always among the
fastest growers. In the 1980s, when the central
government determined all industrial loca-
tions, the state grew at only 5.08 percent per
year,belowthenational averageof5.47percent.
What made the big difference after 1991 was
economic liberalization,which freed industries
to go to states of their choice. Even in the hey-
day of socialism,Gujarat had always beenbusi-
ness-friendly, and it further improved its busi-
ness climate after economic liberalization.5
Quantifying economic freedomorbusiness cli-
mate in different states is a difficult and com-
plex exercise. Such an exercise was undertaken
by the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, which con-
structed an Economic Freedom for the States of
India index, analogous to the Fraser Institute’s
EconomicFreedomof theWorld index.6 That index
rated Gujarat as number one among Indian
states in 2004. The exercise was repeated in
2005, and rated Gujarat as number two.
After 1991, Gujarat’s good business climate
attracted industrialists in droves. The key was
the state’s emphasis on port liberalization.
Gujarat has become, in effect, an Asian eco-
nomic tiger. In the 15 years before the Asian
financial crisis, Thailand and Korea averaged
8.7 percent growth, Taiwan 8.0 percent, Singa-
pore 7.8 percent, Malaysia 7.3 percent, and
Indonesia 7.1 percent. Gujarat’s growth rate in
1991–98, also before the Asian financial crisis,
was a comparable 8.15 percent. Like the tigers,
Gujarat harnessed international trade to accel-
erate growth. And like the tigers, it was hit in
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1997–2002 by the slowdown in world trade
and growth caused by the Asian financial crisis
and global recession. In this period, its major
industries grew at barely 2 percent annually,
and its textile industry suffered greatly.7 The
state’s development was also hit by two major
natural disasters: a cyclone in 1998 and an
earthquake in 2001. But after 2001 the state
resumed rapid growth.
From the 1950s to 1980s, India’ faith in
socialismwassostrongthatnostategraspedthe
logic of port-led development. In China, trade
liberalization and export-led development
transformed the eastern seaboard provinces,
leaving the hinterland provinces far behind.
Some economic studies have shown how mar-
itime states have a growth advantage over land-
lockedones.8Buttradereliesonreasonablyopen
trade policy and good ports to prosper. China’s
maritime provinces recognized this and devel-
opedtheirportstoprovidetheinfrastructurefor
rapid industrial growth. Gujarat followed the
same path from the 1980s onward.
Private enterprise inminor andmajorports
can improve the availability and quality of
infrastructure, thereby reducing the transac-
tions costs of international trade, boosting
trade, and raising incomes. India’smajor ports
remain firmly under central government con-
trol, though since the mid-1990s private par-
ties have been allowed to run container termi-
nals within these ports. To better understand
current government policy, a brief historical
overview is useful.
Historical Background
Formillennia India was among the world’s
greatest mercantile powers. This explains the
title of a recent book,Reintegrating Indiawith the
WorldEconomy.9 In opting for trade-led growth
after 1991, India didnot breaknewground—it
simply went back to its historical traditions.
Throughmost of its history, Gujarat had a
major comparative advantage in international
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Table 1
Annual Average Growth of State GDP for 14 Major States (percent)
State 2000–01 to 2005–06 1991–92 to 1998–99 1980–81 to 1990–91
Gujarat 10.14 8.15 5.08
W. Bengal 6.32 6.97 4.71
Rajasthan 5.01 5.85 6.60
Haryana 8.29 5.13 6.43
Karnataka 5.84 5.87 5.29
Kerala 6.76 5.61 3.57
Andhra Pradesh 6.45 5.20 5.65
Maharashtra 7.06 8.01 6.02
Tamil Nadu 4.87 6.02 5.38
Madhya Pradesh 4.37 5.89 4.56
Orissa 7.84 3.56 4.29
Punjab 4.19 4.77 5.34
Uttar Pradesh 4.17 3.58 4.95
Bihar 2.51 2.88 4.66
ALL INDIA 6.98 6.50 5.47
Source: Calculated by author based on data from India's Ministry of Statics and Programme Implementation, www.mospi.
nic.in; and Montek S. Ahluwalia, “State-level Performance under Economic Reforms in India,” Paper presented at
Advancing Policy Reforms, Stanford University, May 2000.
Note: Excludes minor and special category states (e.g., Delhi, Kashmir) and new states (Uttranchal, Jharkand,
Chattisgarh) carved out of old states.
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trade: it was the closestmaritimeoutlet for the
great empires of North India, such as the
Moghul Empire. Surat and Bharuch, near the
mouths of theNarmada andTapti rivers, were
great historical ports, and the state capital,
Ahmedabad, was a great textile and adminis-
trative center. A sense of that historical tradi-
tion can be gathered from the following pas-
sage describing Gujarat during the 18th and
19th centuries, drawn from The Oxford History
of Indian Business:10
During this period, Ahmedabad and
Surat had provided leadership in ship-
ping and trade in the whole of the west-
ern region. Ahmedabad was the “empo-
rium” of the West, with every possible
commodity from across the world on
display and for sale to the hinterland
markets. This was possible only because
Ahmedabad was part of all-important
trade routes in India and even in neigh-
boring regions. Ahmedabad also had a
significant presence in cotton trade, pro-
duction of textile and fabric, special bro-
cades, basic chemicals, and extraordi-
nary skills in setting stones in jewelery.
Virji Vora of Surat and Zaveri of Ah-
medabad,alongwithseveralotherpower-
ful merchants of Gujarat, held sway over
trade, shipping, money-lending, and
international money transfers for several
decades, sometimes even lending money
to Governments and to the East India
Company in their times of need! Most
markets for money as well as for goods
and services were totally unregulated at
the time. The foundation of the financial
architecture of international transactions
of money was developed successfully in
Gujarat, popularly called the “Hundi”
System and monopolized by the sarafs
(now called shroffs) andGujarati traders,
in the earlier period. Creative manage-
ment structuresof companies suchas the
agency management concept as well as
use and performance accountability of
professionals were experimented with
successfully and informally institutional-
ized in the structure of several business
houses. Clearly there was a vibrant entre-
preneurship, which took risks, experi-
mentedwithnew ideasand led theway in
creating wealth and successes. It is said
that one Mr. Abdul Gafar of Surat alone
traded as much as the entire East India
Company,withhisownshipsnumbering
more than 20 at the time! It is therefore
little surprise that the entrepreneurs of
Gujaratwereamongstthefirst toreapthe
benefits of the technology that drove the
industrial revolutioninEngland,whether
it was steam engines, power looms, shut-
tles, or automated factory processes that
improved quality, increased output, and
standardizedproducts. “Yesterday’s” sup-
pliers of Indian goods to the East India
Company became their biggest distribu-
tors in India, following the reversal of the
direction of trade.
What led to a reversal of this trend? One
answer comes from development economist
Deepak Lal:
By the 1850s, Indian enterprise and capi-
tal using modern imported technology
had set up its own mills, which by 1875
were exporting modern textiles to Lan-
cashire. This overturningof tables led the
English manufacturers to demand (in
collaboration with various do-gooders)
thatthenewlyintroducedFactoryActs, to
protect industrial labor inBritain, should
also be adopted by India—to create a level
playing field! This agitation succeeded,
andfrom1881India introducedthelabor
laws—whose net effect was to raise the
effectivepriceof labor to industry—which
to this day have hobbled Indian industry.
The Indian textile industry,whichhad
pioneered industrialization in the Third
World, now found that it could not com-
pete inexport and laterdomesticmarkets
with the rising industry of Japan.Where-
as the Japanese textile industry was built
on using female laborworking two shifts
a day, the Bombay textile industry was
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hamstrung by labor laws which forbade
such longworking hours.
Indian textile producers demanded
protection and got it. The large home
market, which provided an easy life as it
was increasinglyprotected fromimports,
gave little incentive for Indian producers
to raise efficiency. Thus, began that long
decline which ended upwithmanymills
in the list of sick industries during the
post-Independence period.11
The problem worsened with centralized
planning and industrial licensing in India
after independence in 1947. Bad industrial
policy was compounded by bad port policy.
Major vs. Minor Ports
Gujarat’s ports in the 18th and 19th centu-
ry were shallow ones that could accommodate
the small ships of the time. But as ship sizes
increased, modern ports with dredging and
breakwaters had to be built. The Indian Con-
stitution of 1950 provided that major ports
would fall under the jurisdiction of the central
government, and minor ports largely under
the jurisdiction of state governments.12 Minor
portswere viewed at the time as suitablemain-
ly for fishing and coastal trade. The major
portswere viewed as theprincipal gateways for
international trade.
However, given the ideological emphasis of
both central and state governments on self-suf-
ficiency in the period 1947–90, port develop-
ment andmodernization were never given suf-
ficient attention. Lack of port capacity proved
to be a bottleneck even for India’smodest trade
growth. A World Bank study by Hans Jurgen
Peters in 1990 highlighted the key problems.13
First, container shipswere rapidly replacing tra-
ditionalcargocarriers,but Indianportshadcre-
ated very little container capacity. Second, port
expansion required commensurate expansion
of road and rail links, and Indian planning had
neglected this factor.Third, theworldwas shift-
ing to multimodal transport—the same con-
tainer wasmoved first by ship, then by rail, and
then by road—and so trade required a single set
ofmultimodal transportdocuments.Butobso-
lete Indian rules required dozens of different
documents for eachmode of transport. Finally,
labor-intensive loading at Indianportswas very
slow, but strong trade unions preventedmech-
anization or even labor discipline. The most
devastating critique of this situation comes in a
footnote by Peters: “Because of the low efficien-
cy of unionized labor gangs, most ship opera-
tors prefer to pay these gangs a fee for leaving
the site, anduse their own staff—much fewer in
number—to do the same job at substantially
higher productivity rates.”14
Theonlymajorport that the central govern-
ment built in Gujarat was at Kandla, in the
remote Gulf of Kutch. This port had only a
meter-gauge railway and so could not connect
with themajorbroad-gauge railwaysof thehin-
terland. Road links were also poor. So interna-
tional traffic to and fromNorth India,which in
the 18th and 19th centuries passed mainly
throughGujarat’sports,passed inthe20thcen-
tury mainly through Mumbai, Kolkata, and
Vishakapatnam (which used to be called Bom-
bay, Calcutta, and Vizagapatm, respectively, in
colonial and early post-independence years).
However, the state’s resourceful politicians
found a way out. The Indian Constitution
nowhere defined the size of a major or minor
port.Majorportswere simply those coveredby
a central government law. Thus, Gujarat
found that it could keep expanding its “minor
ports” without limit, even if they became larg-
er than some major ports! The state now has
asmany as 40minor ports (some of which are
loosely called intermediate ports because of
their size), including so-called captive ports
built by big industries.
Captive ports are jetties, with or without a
breakwater, set up by corporations (such as
Reliance Industries Ltd.) to serve their own
import, export, and coastal movement needs.
The corporation alone can use such ports, so
they are called captive ports. The central gov-
ernment, which has always insisted on con-
trolling major ports, has not seen the captive
ports of companies as an ideological or prac-
tical threat and so has not objected to their
5
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emergence. Gujarat has actively encouraged
them.
In terms of efficiency, captive ports would
most sensibly be converted to general ports (so
that other companies could also use the facili-
ties). Limiting port facilities to just one captive
user wastes infrastructure. To the extent
Gujarat has not pressed for the conversion of
captive ports into ports for general use, it has
failed to carry liberalization far enough. How-
ever, companies with captive ports have not
pressed for such liberalization either. They fear
that conversion of a captive port into a general
cargoportwouldbring in somanybureaucrats,
customs staff, and inspectors that their own
speedofoperationsmightbeadversely affected.
For most of the last decade, India’s biggest
port has been Vishakapatnam in the state of
AndhraPradesh.But in2004–05, theminorport
of Sikka inGujarat overtook Vishakapatnam to
becomeIndia’stopport.Thatdemonstrateshow
flexiblyGujarat defined “minor port.” The latest
data show that Vishakapatnam once again
became number one in 2006–07, with 56.3 mil-
lion tons of cargo compared with Sikka’s 55.9
million tons. However, projections suggest that
Sikka will soon regain the top spot, and handle
127million tons by 2020.15
Table 2 shows how well Gujarat has ex-
ploited the loophole ofminor ports and gone
far ahead of other maritime states:
• In the fiscal year ending 2007, its minor
ports handled 123.6 million tons of car-
go, compared with the 53.0million tons
handled by its onlymajor port (Kandla).
• Its minor ports handled more cargo
than all major ports put together in any
other state; the closest rival was Tamil
Nadu, whose three major ports loaded
82.1 million tons.
• Itsminor ports accounted for 123.6mil-
lion tons of the total of 171.9 million
tons handled by all minor ports nation-
wide.
• Among the states with minor ports,
Andhra Pradesh came in a very distant
second to Gujarat, with just 18.6 million
tons.
Evolution of
Gujarat’s Port Policy
Gujarat state was created in 1960, when
the erstwhile state of Bombay was split to
form Gujarat and Maharashtra. In 1982, the
state government enacted a new law creating
an autonomous Gujarat Maritime Board,
which was free to pursue its own initiatives,
unencumbered by the bureaucratic rules of
government departments.
Because of budget constraints, as well as
the state’s business-friendly culture, the GMB
from its inception engaged in a dialogue with
local businessmen. Over the next two decades,
that partnership led to wideranging experi-
ments with private-sector involvement in
ports, including the following:16
• private provision of port services (steve-
6
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Table 2
Largest Ports, by State (millions of tons loaded, 2006–07)
State / UT Major ports Minor ports Total Rank
All India 463.8 171.9 649.2
Gujarat 53.0 123.6 176.6 1
Maharashtra 97.2 11.8 109.0 2
Tamil Nadu 82.1 0.6 82.7 3
Andhra Pradesh 56.4 18.6 75.0 4
Source: Indian Ports Association, 2006–07, http://www.ipa.nic.in/oper.htm and http://shipping.gov.in/writereaddata
/mainlinkfile/File342.xls.
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doring, piloting, tug towing, lighterage,
and dredging)
• captive ports set up by coast-based
industries
• privately managed jetties and terminals
within GMB ports
• new joint-venture ports
• special purpose vehicles to build broad-
gauge rail links to the country’s rail net-
work
• completely private ports, including for-
eign-owned ones
The state government found that industri-
alists favored the creation of brand new, or
greenfield, portswithworld-class facilities and
loading rates. They wantedmodern ports that
were highly automated and free of obstructive
trade unionism. And they wanted quick
approvals for captive ports to serve industries
located near mineral deposits (limestone, salt,
lignite).
The government-business dialogue influ-
enced the formulation of Gujarat’s Port Policy
Statement of December 1995. This document
provided for increased private-sector participa-
tion in existing GMB ports in three ways. First,
incomplete jetties andwharves (still at theplan-
ningorconstructionstage)wouldbeprivatized.
Second, private parties could bid to install
modern mechanical equipment on existing
GMB jetties. Third, private parties could bid to
build new jetties withinGMBports.
The Port Policy Statement also identified
10 greenfield sites for development, each with
its own cargo specialization. Four sites were to
be developed by the GMB along with consor-
tiums of public and private sector compa-
nies.17 Another six siteswere proposed for out-
right private-sector development.18 These
private ports were to be built on the basis of
“BOMT”: build, operate, maintain, and trans-
fer (see Figure 1).
In most Indian states, public enterprises
ostensibly set up for the public good are in
practice used by politicians for kickbacks and
creating patronage networks. Such public
enterprises are typically given a local monop-
oly or preferred access, are typically run to the
ground, and are not considered for privatiza-
tion until they have piled up huge losses and
become nonfunctional. Gujarat has been an
exception to this pattern. From its inception,
the GMB saw itself as an incubator of private
ports, not as aprotector of apublic-sector port
monopoly (see Box 1). The GMB encouraged
joint ventures, provided a significant portion
of the equity, and facilitated quick passage
through the bureaucratic gauntlet of clear-
ances. Once a joint venture began turning a
profit, the GMB would disinvest its equity
stake and use the proceeds to start work on
another port.19
Gujarat sought to exploit its natural mar-
itime advantages. The state’s deeply indented
shores provide 1,600 kilometers of coast, the
most of any state. Almost all India’s coastline
is hit by seasonal monsoons, necessitating the
construction of costly breakwaters (jetties
without breakwaters have to stop loading in
the monsoon months). The Gulf of Kutch in
Gujarat is the only coastal area in India that is
monsoon-free, and so ports and jetties located
there can function all year without breakwa-
ters. The Gulf of Kutch also has the deepest
water in India: a natural draft of 17 meters
without dredging is available at ports like
Mundra and Positra, deep enough to accom-
modate the biggest container ships and large
bulk carriers. Very large crude carriers of up to
400,000 tons cananchor at single-pointmoor-
ings in deep waters many kilometers from the
shore, and unload their cargo through pipe-
lines. No other part of India’s long coastline
can accommodate such large vessels.
The disadvantage of the Gulf of Kutch is
that its northern shoreline is semi-desert, and
the region historically has not been well con-
nected to the rest of India. Gujarat’s best-con-
nected andmost-industrialized belt historical-
ly has been in the stretch betweenBombay and
Ahmedabad. But the ports in that region are
subject to silting andmonsoonal rains, and so
require dredging and breakwaters. The GMB
has sought private investment in this region
too, starting with the ports at Hazira and
Dahej.
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The Business Response
Businessmen from all over India have flock-
edtoGujarat since industrial licensingwasabol-
ished in 1991. Gujarat has long enjoyed a high
rate of industrial growthand investment,which
hasacceleratedsince1991.Onestudypointsout
that Gujarat was eighth in industrial output
among Indian states in 1960 but had risen to
second position by 2001.20 In the 40 years since
its creation, Gujarat’s industrial output has
quadrupledevery10years,with the exceptionof
1990–2000when it quintupled.
State-leveldataonawidevarietyof issuesare
limited and incomplete. The 2004 Gujarat
HumanDevelopmentReport says thatGujarat
accounted for a little under 5 percent of India’s
populationbut7percentof itsGDP,13percent
of its industrialoutput, andno less than16per-
centof all-India investment in1991–2003.21 So,
Gujarat’s share of investment was more than
double its share of national production, reflect-
ing its business popularity. But the state lagged
behind some others in attracting foreign direct
investment (see Box 2).
Another study estimates that the state rep-
resents 20.87 percent of India’s exports and
20.11 percent of imports.22 This highlights the
extent towhichGujarat has harnessed interna-
tional trade for economicdevelopment.Not all
of this trade is port-related: air cargo accounts
for a substantial share of exports and imports.
India is the biggest exporter in theworld of cut
and polished diamonds. The rough stones are
imported, then cut and polished by thousands
of small-scale manufacturers (mostly in
8
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Figure 1
Ports in Gujarat
Note: This map does not include two other proposed greenfield ports at Mitihirwidi and Vansi Borsi, on which little
progress has been made. Pipavav and Mundra used to be joint sector ports but are now fully private. Sikka and Dahej
are sites having both government and private ports.
Source: Adapted from the Gujarat Maritime Board, www.gmbports.org.
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Gujarat), and then exported. Both imports and
exports goby air. A portionof garment exports
also go by air.
Table 3 shows that, among Indian states,
Maharashtra is number one in industrial out-
put, a long way ahead of Gujarat, which is in
second place. But Gujarat is number one in
terms of fixed capital. That demonstrates that
Gujarat has been notably successful in attract-
ing investment, but of a capital-intensive
nature. Its veryhigh level of fixed investment is
notmatched by commensurately high output
or jobs. This is because the state has in recent
decades specialized in chemicals, oil, gas, and
metals—all of which are notably capital-inten-
sive. The share of chemicals and oil in indus-
9
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Box 1
True Liberalization or Industrial Policy?
Is Gujarat’s port liberalization really a form of industrial policy? After all, the experi-
ences of Mundra and Pipavav suggest that privately owned ports can be profitable. So why
did the Gujarat Maritime Board incubate these ports, privatizing them only much later,
instead of just freeing the entire port sector? And why did Gujarat plan a series of indus-
trial parks instead of freeing private ventures to decide for themselves where to set up
shop?
The historical context is that infrastructure of all sorts was neglected in colonial times.
After independence, state governments lacked the resources to create good infrastructure
everywhere. So they sought to create enclaves of decent infrastructure in the form of indus-
trial parks. The private sector could not set up large industrial estates and the attendant
infrastructure (such as ports) because of industrial licensing requirements, lack of access to
financing, undeveloped capital markets, and draconian tax rates.
From the 1960s to the 1990s, high tax rates on income (which at one point touched 97.75
percent) and wealth made it impossible for individuals to legally own significant wealth. All
big banks were nationalized, and the capital markets were moribund. Thus, private-sector
projects depended on loans from government financial institutions, which regarded infra-
structure as the responsibility of the public sector. However, economic liberalization in the
1990s gradually lowered the income tax rate to 33 percent, abolished thewealth tax on shares,
and enabled private-sector companies to accumulate internal resources and develop interna-
tional reputations. Private banks emerged, and capital market reforms attracted large funds
from Indian as well as foreign investors. Today, many Indian companies can raise billions
from capital markets for new projects. Because of this, the new Special Economic Zones will
mainly be privately owned. This raises the hope that government-owned industrial parks may
become obsolete.
Gujarat’s two private ports, Mundra and Pipavav, took many years to attract enough car-
go to become viable. For this reason, state governments see themselves continuing to play
a promotional, incubatory role in minor port development. However, the big privately run
Special Economic Zones should be able to provide enough assured cargo to convince the
capital markets to provide financing for ports serving the SEZs. In November 2007,
Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone, which operates Mundra, made an initial public
offer of 40.25 million shares, and received applications for 105 million shares in the first
half hour on the National Stock Exchange. This provides business confidence that future
public issues by private ports/SEZs will also be able to raise sufficient money from the
investing public. That will help phase out aspects of Gujarat’s port-led development that
today look like industrial policy.
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Box 2
Foreign Direct Investment Lags in Gujarat
In 1997–2003, Gujarat attracted 16 percent of all investment (domestic plus foreign), but
it attracted less than 6 percent of all-India foreign direct investment (FDI) in this period, and
its share of FDI was far behind that of Maharashtra (18 percent), Karnataka (9 percent), and
Tamil Nadu (8 percent).23 Many multinational corporations have invested in Gujarat: General
Motors, General Electric,AT&T,ABB, DuPont, Novartis, Matsushita, and Siemens. But their
investments have been modest.
Three reasons explain the state’s modest performance in FDI. First, Gujarat specializes
in oil and gas, which were public-sector monopolies until the mid-1990s. Second, the state
also specializes in chemicals. However, multinationals have been hesitant to invest in haz-
ardous chemicals since the Union Carbide disaster of 1984 that killed thousands and
maimed hundreds of thousands in Bhopal. (India still seeks extradition of the Union
Carbide president to face criminal charges.) Third, Gujarat’s traditional neglect of English
language skills (now being rectified) has translated into relatively few companies in com-
puter software and business-process outsourcing, sectors in which FDI has flooded into
other states.
Recently, Gujarat’s port-based growth has begun to attract much more FDI. Major inter-
national corporations such as Shell and British Gas are investing in the state.24 The Special
Economic Zone being set up by Reliance Industries Ltd. at Jamnagar has already attracted
Chevron and Rohm and Haas, and expects to attract many more.
Table 3
Fixed Capital, Workers, and Output in Indian States
Fixed Capital Gross Output Net Value
(millions of Number of Number of (millions of Added (millions
State rupees) Factories Workers rupees) of rupees)
Gujarat 870,780 13,950 521,528 1,475,500 168,860
Maharashtra 689,750 17,853 816,501 1,812,220 293,910
Tamil Nadu 358,960 18,912 896,732 943,600 146,210
Karnataka 316,100 6,987 366,403 551,340 97,710
Uttar Pradesh 302,140 9,157 382,821 670,370 100,060
Andhra Pradesh 300,720 14,238 751,005 639,190 103,350
West Bengal 249,120 6,195 432,930 439,140 62,590
Rajasthan 142,130 5,279 178,521 322,270 48,230
Madhya Pradesh 133,300 3,019 158,230 382,260 59,560
Punjab 84,180 7,249 271,845 380,260 54,290
All India 4,319,600 128,549 5,957,848 9,624,560 1,443,020
Source: Sunil Parekh, “Gujarat’s Industrial Development: A Perspective,” Working paper presented at workshop at
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, September 24, 2004.
Note: Fixed capital is depreciated book value of assets.
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trial output is the biggest and fastest growing
(see Appendix). The share ofmetals and alloys
has also risen rapidly.
The Contribution of Ports
to Development
Howdoes onemeasure the contribution of
ports to Gujarat’s economic development?
Clearly, the state’s business climate is such
that it would have fared comparatively well
even had it been landlocked. But one way of
measuring the value added by the state’s port-
led development policy is to look at the pro-
portion of Gujarat’s international trade that
serves the hinterland of North India, and the
portion that serves the state’s own industries.
One study estimates that as much as 70
percent of the state’s imports are used within
the state, and only 30 percent go to the hinter-
land.25 This suggests that Gujarat’s ports have
not been gateways to North India as much as
gateways toGujarat’s own industries. ThePort
Policy Statement of 1995 projects that 50 per-
cent of newly created port capacity will be for
use within the state. That is an extraordinarily
high proportion. It suggests that ports have
contributed, andwill continue to contribute, a
great deal to the addition of value within the
state and to its overall growth.
Creating a largenumberofnewports is not
necessarily the best form of development.26
Some experts have objected that, to the extent
that cargo is meant for the hinterland, new
ports may simply “cannibalize” cargo from
older ports. Economies of scale suggest that
expanding older ports may be more efficient
than building new ones. After all, the older
ports already have rail and road connections.
However, this logic does not apply to cap-
tive ports and jetties built by coast-based
industries. Captive jetties obviously address
business needs better than existing ports that
are some distance away. New ports will not
cannibalize the cargo of older ports if they
serve new SEZs that generate fresh cargo.
Gujarat has progressed fast on captive ports
and jetties, positioning it do well in new SEZs.
Three of India’s biggest cement compa-
nies—Grasim, Gujarat Ambuja Cement, and
Sanghi Industries—have a total of seven cap-
tive jetties in the state, and othermajor Indian
and international corporations have set up
captive jetties or specialized terminals aswell.27
By far the biggest captive jetties are those of
Reliance Industries Ltd. at Sikka, which cur-
rently load 52 million tons per year of crude
oil, refined products, and chemicals.28
According to projections made by Credit
Rating Information Services of India Ltd. (a
subsidiary of Standard and Poor’s) additional
port capacity to be created by 2020 will be
127.57million tonsatSikka,97.86milliontons
at Mundra, 45.23 million tons at Pipavav, and
37.07million tons at Dahej.29 To put these fig-
ures in perspective, Vishakapatnam, India’s
biggestmajorport, handlednomore than55.8
million tons in 2005–06.
Thenewports have alsohelpedbring forth
new industries. The most important example
of this is the emergence of a global pipeline
hub at Anjar, near Mundra port, which caters
to the burgeoning oil and gas industry world-
wide, as well as to Indian needs for water and
sewerage pipes. Five companies have already
set up a combined pipeline capacity of 1.5
million tons per year, and this is being dou-
bled.30 These companies make the entire
range of gas, oil, and water pipes, including
the extra-wide and thick pipes required for
the deepest oceanwaters. Pipes for oil and gas
are bulky, up to 20 meters long, and Mundra
has ample space for handling such pipes
(whereas thiswould be difficult at big ports in
major cities like Mumbai).
Heavy plate, which is needed for manufac-
turing oil and gas pipelines, is currently being
imported from Europe. To overcome this
dependence, Welspun Gujarat Stahl Rohrer
has set up a captive platemill, and plans to set
up a captive steel plant too. Jindal Saw has set
up a blast furnace to produce iron for ductile
pipes. And other companies are also contem-
plating steel-making facilities. So, the pipeline
hub isbecominga steel hub, too.Thenewsteel
plants use imported coal and iron ore, so their
port location is ideal. Pipe factories have also
11
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been built at Dahej. B. K. Goenka, CEO of
Welspun Gujarat Stahl Rohrer, estimates that
India now accounts for almost a quarter of
world steel pipe exports.31
Another example of port-induced indus-
trialization is the ship-building industry. For
a long time, Gujarat was famous for ship-
breaking rather than ship-building. It boast-
ed the biggest ship-breaking yard in the
world at Alang. Ships would be beached at
high tide and then cut apart manually using
blow-torches. Alang’s main advantage was
cheap labor, an advantage than began to dis-
appear when Bangladesh created rival ship-
breaking yards with even cheaper labor.
Alang is now declining, but new shipyards
and repair facilities are sprouting. ABG Ship-
yard is setting up amajor ship-building facility
at Dahej, capable of constructing very large
crude carriers. The Adani group is setting up
another major shipyard at Mundra, capable of
building Panamax-size bulk carriers. SKIL
Infrastructure Ltd. is setting up a major ship-
yard at Pipavav, where it earlier built a private
port. L&Thas longbeenbuildingoffshoreplat-
forms and support vessels at Hazira. Smaller
facilities for building and repairing ships are
operatedbyAlcockAshdowninBhavnagar,and
Orum Shipyard in Porbandar. Ship building is
ahighly cyclical industry, so thenew facilities in
Gujaratwill also be used for ship repairs, which
are not cyclical. Ship building and ship repair-
ing arehighly labor-intensive, so Indian compa-
nies are confident of beating old shipyards in
Europe and America, as well as the newer ones
in Japan andKorea.
Looking to the Future
Gujarat’s futureportpolicy appears tohave
two prongs. One is to become India’s main
gateway to the North Indian hinterland. The
second is to create Special Economic Zones
adjacent to its new ports to attract export-ori-
ented industries.
Currently, the North Indian hinterland is
servedmainly byMumbai Port and the neigh-
boring Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, both in
the state of Maharashtra. Gujarat’s ports are
much closer to North India, but they are less
well connected by rail and road thanMumbai.
In India, the railways are a monopoly of the
central government. Despite many decades of
planning, the railways have been unable to
meet the needs of even these major ports, and
so have lacked both the finances and motiva-
tion to help develop the minor ports run by
state governments.
To get past this problem, Gujarat has cre-
ated special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for
building rail links. The state government, pri-
vate port players, and the railways all partici-
pate in these SPVs. This arrangement has
overcome the usual financial andmanagerial
constraints: the railways are happy to collab-
orate in ventures that require limited funds
from them but generate substantial addi-
tional revenue. Through SPVs, broad-gauge
links have been built between the new ports
at Mundra and Pipavav and the Delhi-
Mumbai rail artery, thus providing national
connectivity to the minor ports. SPVs will be
createdwhenever necessary to ensure connec-
tivity for the 10 new ports that are planned.
In essence, SPVs respond to the central gov-
ernment’s ban on private-sector construction
and operation of railway tracks. This remains
an issue for the unfinished reform agenda.
To meet India’s burgeoning traffic needs,
the railways now plan to build a new, dedicat-
ed Delhi-Mumbai freight corridor. Gujarat is
getting ready to link its ports to this new rail
corridor. By doing so, it hopes to get the lion’s
share of hinterland traffic. It can also hope to
add at least 10 percent in value to hinterland
cargo through consolidation, packaging, and
processing.32
The second prong of Gujarat’s future
strategy is to cash in on the central govern-
ment’s policy for SEZs. The chief minister of
Gujarat, Narendra Modi, says he wants his
state to become the SEZ capital of India. He
boasts in public speeches that 33 SEZs in the
state have already been approved.33
The government of Gujarat decided long
ago that, to ensure cargo for its port-led strat-
egy, it needed to create industrial parks linked
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to each port. It commissioned Credit Rating
Information Services of India Ltd. to prepare
the report, BIG 2020: Blueprint for Infrastructure
in Gujarat 2020. The report called for the con-
struction of 17 industrial parks which would
be “demand drivers” of new ports (and also of
air cargo).34
However, state governments all over the
country have built industrial parks, andmany
have not been successful. Corporations will
not flock to industrial estates unless they offer
something special. That extra something may
now come from tax breaks and good infra-
structure promised by the new SEZ policy.
Since the 1960s, India has attempted to
encourage exported-oriented industries by
creating eight Free Trade Zones. These have
achieved only modest results in terms of in-
vestment and exports. All but one of themwas
built by the government. These zones have
often lacked good infrastructure, and typically
have offered modest-sized industrial plots
unsuitable for large industries. In contrast,
China has succeeded by building large SEZs
with world-class infrastructure (captive power
supply, water supply, ports, and airports).
To try to imitateChina’s success, the Indian
government announced the new SEZ policy in
February 2006.Companies settingup factories
in SEZs will have a total tax holiday for five
years, 50 percent tax exemption for the next
five years, and exemption for reinvested profits
for five years more. Unlike the old Free Trade
Zones, the SEZs are to be developed by the pri-
vate sector and foreign investors, with develop-
ers getting a tax holiday for 10 years. Industries
in SEZs will probably have more flexibility in
hiring and firing employees than industries
outside. India’s labor laws prohibit any firm
withmore than 100 employees from shedding
labor, save with the permission of the relevant
state government, and in practice this permis-
sion is rarely given. The SEZ law provides that
state governments can relax labor laws for
units located in SEZs, andGujarat has formal-
ly said that it will provide such flexibility.
The central government has received pro-
posals formore than 400 SEZs.Many of these
are tiny enclaves of 10 to 40 hectares, and this
has attracted some criticism. ShenzhenSEZ in
China occupies 45,000 hectares. China’s suc-
cess has been based not only on liberal policies
such as tax breaks, but also on world-class
infrastructure for large manufacturing com-
plexes. Indian criticsworry that the SEZpolicy
may create a multitude of small tax havens
rather than a focused group of world-class
manufacturing enclaves.
Gujarat is well placed to build some of the
biggest SEZs in India. It has a relatively good
business climate, and businessmen believe
Gujarat’s government is serious in promising
labor flexibility within SEZs. The state wants
itsnewports tobehighlymechanizedanddeep
enough to receive the biggest container ships,
bulk carriers, and tankers. Other states are
planning SEZs aroundmajor ports, butmajor
ports are typically locatedat large citieswith lit-
tle spare land in the neighborhood. Gujarat’s
new ports, however, are all located far from
major cities andhavemuchspare land for large
SEZs. Population density is especially low (and
land availability correspondingly high) in the
semi-desert areas of Kutch, so displacement
and resettlement problems (which have
plagued projects in other states) should be
minimal there.35
The Gujarat government should abandon
its old plans for industrial parks in favor of
SEZs. Thiswill reduce bureaucracy and implic-
it subsidies. Whereas industrial parks are typi-
cally government-owned, the SEZswill typical-
ly be private-sector ventures.
Lessons for Other
Developing Countries
Historically, ports in virtually all develop-
ing countries were built and run by govern-
ment agencies. But in the last decade, port lib-
eralization has been gathering momentum in
Africa, LatinAmerica, andAsia. Resistance has
sometimes come from entrenched govern-
ment agencies and trade unions fearing a loss
of jobs. Political instability sometimes deters
foreign investors, and local investors often
lack the required skills and access to finance.
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In Africa, almost 70 percent of ports are still
run by the public sector. Russia has introduced
private participation in only one port, St.
Petersburg.36 In Pakistan, as many as 13 min-
istries have a say in the runningof the country’s
biggest port atKarachi, causingdelays andpro-
ceduralhurdles (whichhave eased recently after
private participationwas invited at some termi-
nals). In Bangladesh, successive governments
have considered private participation in run-
ning the country’s main port, Chittagong, but
have always backed down in the face of trade
union threats. The current caretaker govern-
ment (controlledby theArmy)hasbrought in a
private operator to perform some functions at
one terminal, but thismaynot lastwhen a civil-
ian government returns to power.
Gujarat’s success holds lessons for develop-
ing countries searching for ways to improve
efficiency. It has shown how to first develop
minorports and thenupgrade themtobecome
major ports. In some countries, political oppo-
sition to full-scale privatization may exist, and
local entrepreneurs may lack the skills and
financial capacity they need to participate in
full-scale port privatization. Gujarat has shown
how to overcome such problems through pri-
vatization in stages. A start can bemade by pri-
vatizing the provision of port services such as
stevedoring, piloting, tug towing, lighterage,
anddredging. Thenext step canbe the creation
ofprivatelymanaged jetties and terminalswith-
in government-owned ports. Next, captive jet-
ties can be set up by coast-based industries.
Finally, entirely new, privately owned ports can
come up. An important supplementary invest-
mentwill beneeded in rail links fromnewports
to the hinterland. This strategy of privatization
in stages can reduce the financial strength
needed to get into the business, and thus
increase the universe of entrepreneurs capable
of competing and decrease political opposition
to privatization. Using this step-by-step
approach, Gujarat has shown that it is feasible
for all developing countries to pursue port lib-
eralization and privatization. It has also shown
how private investment can be used to create
rail links with the hinterland, an important
requirement for most ports. This approach
yields major gains—better and cheaper infra-
structure (which increases the profitability of
exports andhenceeconomicgrowth), thedevel-
opment of new port-based industries, and skill
development—which will come in handy when
developing new ports in the future.
Conclusion
Gujarat has pioneered the concept of port
liberalization in India andused this to become
the country’s fastest-growing state. It has
shown vision in converting “minor ports” into
some of the biggest ports in the country. The
state has broken new ground with different
forms of privatization. It has devised SPVs to
build rail links between new ports and the
country’s main rail system. The state’s private
ports have greatly improved its ability to take
advantage of the central government’s recent
scheme for Special Economic Zones.
Historically, portshavebeen inefficient gov-
ernmentmonopolies.Gujarathasdemonstrat-
ed that various forms of private participation
can greatly improve the availability and effi-
ciency of port infrastructure. Those improve-
ments, in turn, can create industrial centers
(such as the pipeline hub at Anjar and several
new shipyards) that did not exist earlier.
These results hold salutary lessons for other
Indian states. Having seen Gujarat’s success,
other Indian coastal states want to follow suit.
Most have now set up their own statemaritime
boards, but it will be a long time before they
catch up with Gujarat. The Maharashtra
Maritime Board aims to upgrade Maharash-
tra’s 48 minor ports, typically with private par-
ticipation, andmake someof thembigger than
existing major ports. Rewas port is going to be
developed by Reliance Industries Ltd. as the
deepest port in the state, serving a Special Eco-
nomicZonebeing setupby the samecompany.
The central government has only half-
learned the lessons from Gujarat. In the 1990s,
it began to allow private-sector operators to
build and run new container terminals within
itsmajor ports. That is partial liberalization. Yet
it is bad practice for the government, which is
14
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the port landlord and regulator, to run some of
the berths and terminals itself: itmay be tempt-
ed to give special attention and benefits to its
own terminals but not those run by private
operators. For good governance, the port land-
lord and regulator should avoid operating any
jetties or terminals itself. Unfortunately, the
Indian government is unwilling to privatize
existingterminals, letaloneexistingmajorports.
Finally, Gujarat’s experience holds lessons
for other developing countrieswishing to con-
vert minor ports to major ones, and for those
seeking to introduceprivate-sector investment
andmanagement in ports. Gujarat has shown
how this can be done in phases, gradually
building up local skills and capacity. Ideally,
countries should freely permit private invest-
ment in anyport facility. But for historical and
political reasons, phased liberalization in
some developing countries may prove more
practical, and attract less political and trade
union resistance, than outright privatization.
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Appendix
Production Growth in Gujarat’s Industrial Sectors, 1991–1992 to 2000–2001 (millions
of rupees)
1991–92 1992–93 2000–01
Net Net Net
value Fixed value Fixed value Fixed
Output added Capital Output added Capital Output added Capital
Textile 46,220 5,650 13,050 53,220 6,750 23,220 153,570 15,360 97,580
Chemical* 83,610 14,490 54,780 122,920 27,860 94,160 537,390 93,300 371,630
Machinery 29,740 5,370 12,410 33,710 5,990 15,530 80,270 24,840 19,570
Plastic and
Petroleum** 29,670 1,420 15,020 48,390 16,250 27,750 139,890 11,410 38,660
Food Processing** 39,480 3,040 9,300 48,030 2,730 9,370 118,770 8,290 19,500
Metals and
Alloys** 24,370 2,890 9,000 29,390 3,960 13,440 78,930 9,710 76,250
Others 33,600 7,510 17,810 46,120 7,290 18,360 141,860
Nonmetallic minerals 39,320 8,350 43,960
All Industry 307,630 40,920 170,620 414,290 80,390 260,130 1,289,620 191,490 717,510
*Chemicals constituted 15 percent of national chemical production.
**The state’s economy saw three additional major areas emerge: plastics and petroleum, food, and metals
and alloys.
Source: Sunil Parekh, “Gujarat’s Industrial Development: A Perspective,” Working paper presented at
workshop at Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, September 24, 2004.
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